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Recent years have seen the rise of middleboxes, such as
NATs, firewalls, or TCP accelerators. Those middleboxes
play an important role in today’s Internet, including enter-
prise networks and cellular networks. However, despite their
undisputable success in modern network architecture, their
actual impact on packets, traffic, and network performance
is not that much understood. In this paper, we propose a
path impairment oriented middlebox classification that aims
at categorizing the initial purpose of a middlebox policy as
well as its potential complications.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the standard and well-known description of
the TCP/IP architecture (i.e., the end-to-end principle) is not
anymore applicable in a wide range of network situations.
Enterprise networks, WiFi hotspots, and cellular networks
usually see the presence of middleboxes [1] as being part of
the network architecture in addition to traditional network
hardware [16].
There is a wide range of middleboxes, going from “sim-
ple” NAT to complex system that can potentially modify
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headers beyond IP. Unfortunately, it has been shown that
middleboxes have a negative impact on the TCP protocol
(and its extensions) evolution [10, 11]. Large-scale studies of
middleboxes deployment is therefore vital for the transport
protocols field. However, the majority of existing studies
of middlebox deployment rely on having access to config-
urations from enterprise networks or ISPs, which greatly
reduce their scope [3, 16, 20]. Moreover, there is no rigorous
behavioral middlebox classification according to their effects
on packets, on traffic, or on the network quality experienced
by users.
In this paper, we advocate for an observation-based mid-
dlebox policy taxonomy, that aims at categorizing the initial
purpose of a middlebox policy as well as its potential un-
expected complications. To achieve this, we run one-sided
active network measurement tools on as many paths as possi-
ble: tracebox [4, 7, 17, 21], an extension to traceroute [19]
that infers and locates in-pathmodifications, PATHSpider [12,
13, 18], a tool that performs one-sidedA/B testing of transport-
layer features to highlight in-path impairments, and copycat [8],
a tool that evaluates experimental protocols’ deployability,
by comparing their processing by the network to TCP.
Then, we aggregate collected observations in a path trans-
parency observatory (PTO) [15], with the aim of building
an Internet-wide view of what middleboxes do to packets,
on which Internet paths, and to separate low-level data han-
dling and high-level analysis. We use this as a substrate for
classifying middlebox policies.
2 TAXONOMY
From an open dataset composed of 518 million tracebox
probes on IPv4 wired networks [2, 7], we make an attempt at
categorizing inferred middlebox behavior 1 by proposing a
path-impairment oriented middlebox policy taxonomy [5, 6].
As illustrated in Fig. 1, our taxonomy is based on three meta-
categories that compose a policy: (i) Capability, what the
policy expects to achieve, its purpose; (ii) Action, how the
policy tries to achieve its goals, the fate of a packet crossing a
middlebox that implements this policy; (iii) Complication,
the potential resulting path connectivity deterioration.
We consider two basic kinds of Actions: Drop and Rewrite.
This aspect is decisive because policies that apply different
1We are in the process of including the other datasets.
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Figure 1: A middlebox policy taxonomy.
actions will more likely cause different types of network
dysfunctions.
Then, we consider five categories of Capabilities (i.e., a
middlebox basic feature that can be configured to enforce a
policy).
Translation capabilities, that perform dynamical mapping
of certain fields of a flow packets between two networks
in order to be understood by each one of them (e.g., NATs).
Authorization capabilities, that are implemented by middle-
boxes that discard a flow if it meets certain criterions (e.g.,
filtering, TCP window-checking). Normalization capabilities,
that transform a flow by modifying fields or options in the
transport header, to comply to a network policy. For exam-
ple, middleboxes that limit a protocol features to a restricted
subset to prevent the use of unwanted features. Correction
capabilities, that aims at fixing endpoint implementations by
transforming flows. For example, sequence number random-
ness. And Packet Marking capabilities (e.g., Differentiated
Services Code Point (DSCP), Explicit Congestion
Notification (ECN)), that are normally not considered
middlebox behavior but our observations showed cases of
erroneous marking, via the legacy IP ToS field, encroaching
on the ECN bytes, and defective ECN implementations.
We categorize Complications caused by middlebox policies
by examining (i) their technical Causes, manufacturers and
policy designers fundamental errors or deliberated choices
and (ii) their Consequences.
Over-normalization refers to a policy that limits protocol
features and options to a restricted subset. This type of be-
havior may constrains the design of new extensions [11], or
limit protocol performance by preventing the usage of its
entire capabilities, or by taking drop decisions.
Incomplete modifications refers to policies that fail to en-
sure completeness of their modification(s). When middle-
boxes modify a specific protocol field but not other seman-
tically related fields, allowing modified data alongside un-
modified data. They may fail to identify all related fields or
simply neglect them for performance concerns.
A Paradigm shift happens when both ends running a pro-
tocol still assume 2-way peering relationships. Middleboxes
cause both endpoints to undergo a paradigm shift de facto to
n-way peering relationships [14]. As many mechanisms are
not designed to handle this new paradigm, errors may occur.
When both ends try to share state related data or to negotiate
Capability Complication causes
Translation 1.3% Malconfiguration 2.9%
Normalization 41.0% Incomplete modifications 56.1%
Correction 54.8% Over-Normalization 41.0%
Packet marking 2.4% Complication consequences
Authorization NA Traffic disruption 57.2%
Unknown 0.5% Blocked traffic 1.3%
Disabled features 41%
Unknown 0.5%
Table 1: Capabilities and Complications distributions.
capabilities, this phenomenon may, in certain scenarios, put
both ends in conflicting states [10].
Finally, we identify as Malconfigurations vendor imple-
mentation or design errors in capabilities, leading to faulty
middlebox policies.
Among the Consequences (i.e., what both ends actually
experience), Traffic disruption policies impairs performances,
they may, for example, interfere with control data rendering
it useless, or reduce bandwidth. Blocked traffic policies, that
can be either explicit (sending TCP RST packet) or implicit
(dropping packets). Middlebox policies may also prevent
the use of features considered unknown or unsafe. If done
symmetrically, consequences are limited to the inability to
use them; it is a Feature-disabling policy. If the modifications
are asymmetric and the negotiation is not resilient enough,
a Negotiation disruption policy may fail to disable the feature
correctly and lead to inconsistent protocol states [10].
Capabilities and consequences distributions are displayed
in Table 1. We did not observe authorization policies because
they are mostly out of scope for the measurement techniques
that we are currently using. Our probes inferred few transla-
tion capabilities because NATs are required to be invisible to
tracebox [9]. However, we recently developed a technique
to detect them regardless [21]. We also observed that few
packet marking capabilities are prone to create transport-
level impairment. Finally, we observed large proportions of
normalization and correction middleboxes, with an advan-
tage for the second category that can be explain by the fact
that middleboxes implementing such policies tends to be
located closer to access networks, which affects more paths
in our dataset. A second explanation is that normalization
policies have more incentives to be invisible because they
reveal pieces of information about AS traffic engineering.
Finally, we find that the most common impairments are
traffic disruption and disabled features, and that they are
caused by, respectively, incomplete packet modifications and
over-normalization.
3 NEXT STEPS
In the future, we plan to augment the PTO with observa-
tions from our other networkmeasurement tools ( PATHSpider
and copycat [8, 13]) and ourNAT-detectionmethodology [21],
and to use them to refine the taxonomy. We are also planning
to implement middleboxes classes in a simulator for offline
protocol testing.
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Furthermore, we plan to add operational middleboxes
characteristics. In particular, we are interested in middle-
box prevalence (e.g., if a firewall is set up, does all traffic
go through that firewall?), persistence over time (e.g., is a
middlebox up and running all the time, or do we observe any
dynamics as for IP networks?), and middlebox position in its
AS topology (e.g., at the border or in the core) [7].
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This project has received funding from the EuropeanUnion’s
Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under grant
agreement No 688421. The opinions expressed and argu-
ments employed reflect only the authors’ views. The Euro-
pean Commission is not responsible for any use that may be
made of that information.
REFERENCES
[1] B. Carpenter and S. Brim. 2002. Middleboxes: Taxonomy and Issues.
RFC 3234. Internet Engineering Task Force.
[2] MAMI Consortium. 2016. Path Transparency Observatory. (2016).
https://observatory.mami-project.eu/
[3] L. D’Acunto, N. Chiluka, T. Vinò, and H. J. Sips. 2013. BitTorrent-Like
P2P Approaches for VoD: a Comparative Study. Computer Networks
(COMNET) 57, 5 (April 2013), 1253–1276.
[4] G. Detal, b. Hesmans, O. Bonaventure, Y. Vanaubel, and B. Donnet.
2013. Revealing Middlebox Interference with Tracebox. In Proc. ACM
Internet Measurement Conference (IMC).
[5] K. Edeline and B. Donnet. 2015. On a Middlebox Classification. In IAB
Workshop on Stack Evolution in a Middlebox Internet (SEMI).
[6] K. Edeline and B. Donnet. 2015. Towards aMiddlebox Policy Taxonomy:
Path Impairments. In Proc. 7th IEEE International Workshop on Science
for Communication Networks (NetSciCom).
[7] K. Edeline and B. Donnet. 2017. A First Look at the Prevalence and
Persistence of Middleboxes in theWild. In Proc. International Teletraffic
Congress (ITC).
[8] K. Edeline, M. Kühlewind, B. Trammell, and B. Donnet. 2017. copycat:
Testing Differential Treatment of New Transport Protocols in the
Wild. In Proc. ACM/IRTF/ISOC Applied Networking Research Workshop
(ANRW).
[9] S. Guha, B. Ford, S. Senthil, and S. Pyda. 2009. NAT Behavioral Require-
ments for ICMP. RFC 5508. Internet Engineering Task Force.
[10] B. Hesmans, F. Duchene, C. Paasch, G. Detal, and O. Bonaventure. 2013.
Are TCP Extensions Middlebox-Proof?. In Proc. Workshop on Hot Topics
in Middleboxes and Network Function Virtualization (HotMiddlebox).
[11] M. Honda, Y. Nishida, C. Raiciu, A. Greenhalgh, M. Handley, and H.
Tokuda. 2011. Is It Still Possible to Extend TCP. In Proc. ACM Internet
Measurement Conference (IMC).
[12] I. R Learmonth, A. Lutu, G. Fairhurst, D. Ros, and Ö. Alay. 2017. Path
transparency measurements from the mobile edge with PATHspider.
In Proc. Network Traffic Measurement and Analysis Conference (TMA).
[13] I. R Learmonth, B. Trammell, M. Kühlewind, and G. Fairhurst. 2016.
PATHspider: A tool for active measurement of path transparency. In
Proc. ACM/IRTF/ISOC Applied Networking Research Workshop (ANRW).
[14] M. A. Lemley and L. Lessig. 2000. The End of End-to-End: Preserving
the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era. Technical Report
2000-19. University of California at Los Angeles.
[15] S. Neuhaus, R. Münter, K. Edeline, B. Donnet, and E. Gubser. 2016.
Towards an observatory for network transparency research. In Proc.
ACM/IRTF/ISOC Applied Networking Research Workshop (ANRW).
[16] J. Sherry, S. Hasan, C. Scott, A. Krishnamurthy, S. Ratnasamy, and V.
Sekar. 2012. Making Middleboxes Someone Else’s Problem: Network
Processing as a Cloud Service. In Proc. ACM SIGCOMM.
[17] V. Thirion, K. Edeline, and B. Donnet. 2015. Tracking Middleboxes
in the Mobile World with TraceboxAndroid. In Proc. 7th International
Workshop on Traffic Monitoring and Analysis (TMA).
[18] B. Trammell, M. Kühlewind, P. De Vaere, I. R Learmonth, and G.
Fairhurst. 2017. Tracking transport-layer evolution with PATHspi-
der. In Proc. ACM/IRTF/ISOC Applied Networking Research Workshop
(ANRW).
[19] V. Jacobson et al. 1989. traceroute. man page. UNIX.
[20] Z. Wang, Z. Qian, Q. Xu, Z. Mao, and M. Zhang. 2011. An Untold Story
of Middleboxes in Cellular Networks. In Proc. ACM SIGCOMM.
[21] R. Zullo, A. Pescapé, K. Edeline, and B. Donnet. 2017. Hic Sunt NATs:
Uncovering Address Translation with a Smart Traceroute. In Proc.
IEEE/IFIP Workshop on Mobile Network Measurement (MNM).
